Oak Park; "The Spread of the Peace Idea," before the adult Bible Class of the same church; "The Demand for Progress in Religion, in its Interpretation, in its Application," at a banquet of the Young People's Society of Christian Endeavor of the First Congregational Church of Evanston.

Blank petitions, commending our national government for its part in the movement for an improved International Court of Justice, urging the appointment of a Peace Commission as voted for by Congress, and remonstrating against any further increase in the navy, have been mailed to one thousand pastors in Chicago. Replies already have begun to come in.

Chicago was permitted to have ten days of the services of Mrs. Lucia Ames Mead of Boston. Among other activities, Mrs. Mead filled the following engagements: The Chicago Woman's Club (two addresses), the Humboldt Avenue Swedenborgian Church, the Chicago Normal School, Northwestern University, Chicago (Congregational) Theological Seminary, Lake Forest College, Lake Forest Academy, Ferry Hall School (Lake Forest), Rev. Dr. Tobias Schanfarber's Synagogue and Rockford College.

While in this city Mrs. Mead made arrangements for the publication in the *Record-Herald* of a symposium on "What Chicago Could Do with Some of Its War Money." Similar discussions have been published in Boston, Buffalo and Cincinnati. The Field Secretary has written the introductory article, showing that Chicago people will probably pay for war purposes, between 1910 and 1920, $41,000,000 *more* than they paid in the decade ending with the Spanish War. For the purpose of specific comparison, this sum is divided up arbitrarily into four nearly equal parts. Miss Addams and Dr. Graham Taylor will show how $10,000,000 could be spent advantageously in Chicago in the next ten years for various civic improvements and social engineering projects; Mr. Frank E. Wing, superintendent of the Tuberculosis Institute, will tell what $10,000,000 would do in the war against disease; Prof. C. H. Judd of the University of Chicago will suggest $10,000,000 worth of improvements in the educational system; while the remaining $11,000,000 will be entrusted to that prince of architectural dreamers, Mr. Daniel H. Burnham, to help him to realize a "Chicago Beautiful." The symposium will be illustrated with some of Mr. Burnham's drawings, which have recently been attracting so much attention in Europe.

The Chicago Woman's Club invited our office to prepare the program for its monthly meeting on January 11. The general subject of the meeting was "International Peace." Addresses were made by Miss Addams, Mrs. Mead, Prof. Charles Cheney Hyde, Hon. H. N. Higinbotham and the Field Secretary. Mrs. Charles Henrotin opened the informal discussion.

The annual business meeting of the Chicago Peace Society was held on Saturday, January 21. As stated in last month's ADVOCATE OF PEACE, the new society closed its first year with all bills paid. The new president is Mr. Leroy A. Goddard, president of the State Bank of Chicago, and also of the Bankers' Club and of the Chicago Clearing House. The vice-president is Mr. Edward M. Skinner, who has proved himself such a loyal friend to our work, both as president of the Chicago Association of Commerce (which did so much to make possible the 1909 National Peace Congress), and as a faithful member of our executive committee during the past year. Mr. Charles L. Hutchinson, vice-president of the Corn Exchange National Bank, is treasurer. Mr. Harry A. Wheeler, who was reëlected to the executive committee, has just been elected president of the Association of Commerce. To Hon. George E. Roberts and Mr. Alfred L. Baker, our past presidents, we are under a special debt of gratitude for helping to put our young society on its feet.

153 LaSalle Street, Chicago.

A Hymn for Peace.

To the tune of "America."

[Andrew Carnegie is circulating by the thousand the following hymn, which was written by George Huntington, librarian of Carleton College, Northfield, Minn. Professor Huntington has long been an active member of the American Peace Society.]

Two empires by the sea,
Two nations great and free,
  One anthem raise.
One race of ancient fame,
One tongue, one faith we claim,
One God, whose glorious name
  We love and praise.

What deeds our fathers wrought,
What battles we have fought,
  Let fame record.
Now vengeful passions cease;
Come, victories of peace;
Nor hate, nor pride's caprice,
  Unsheath the sword.

Though deep the sea, and wide,
'Twixt realm and realm, its tide
  Binds strand to strand.
So be the gulf between
Gray coasts and islands green
With bonds of peace serene,
  And friendship spanned.

Now may the God above
Guard the dear land we love,
  Both east and west.
Let love more fervent glow,
As peaceful ages go,
And strength yet stronger grow,
  Blessing and blest.

Interstate Controversies in the Supreme Court of the United States.

BY JUSTICE BROWN OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES (RETIRED).

Address delivered at the Conference of the Society for the Judicial Settlement of International Disputes, at Washington, December 16, 1910.

(Concluded from January issue.)

The case was vigorously contested by the most eminent counsel of their generation, was carried to the Supreme Court several times after the jurisdiction was settled, and finally resulted in the report of the commissioners being

sustained, and a decree, which concerned a strip of land four miles in width across the north end of the State, was made awarding the territory in dispute to Massachusetts; and thus a controversy which had existed over two hundred years was peacefully and amicably settled. The dispute had naturally crept into the politics of both States, and their relations at one time had been quite embittered.

The case of *Missouri* vs. *Iowa* [1] was also a boundary case, and involved purely a question of fact as to a certain line run in pursuance of a treaty with the Indians and the existence of certain rapids on the Des Moines River.

In the case of *Florida* vs. *Georgia* [2] (1854) the only question decided was that the United States was entitled to intervene, though not as a party, and be heard upon the ground that it represented the interests of twenty-nine other States, which could not be made parties to the action. It does not appear what became of the case.

The case of *Virginia* vs. *West Virginia* [3] (1870), while nominally a boundary case, really involved the question whether two counties of Virginia had been properly transferred to West Virginia at the time of the separation of the two States. The decree was that they had been.

In *Missouri* vs. *Kentucky*, [4] decided in the same year, it was held that Wolf Island in the Missouri River belonged to Kentucky.

Cases where a river is the boundary between two States have been peculiarly prolific of litigation. That of *Alabama* vs. *Georgia* [5] turned largely upon the definition of the word "river" when used as a boundary line. It was held that, under the circumstances of the case, the State of Georgia was bounded by the west bank of the Chattahoochee River, and was the proprietor and owner of the bed of the river. While the word "river" when used as a boundary ordinarily imports a line drawn through the centre of the river or thread of the stream, it so happens that in several cases the bed of the river was given to one of the States and the line made to run along the bank. The case seems really to have turned upon the question whether the bed of the river was bounded by its high or by its usual water mark.

A similar case was that of *Indiana* vs. *Kentucky*, [6] which involved a tract of two thousand acres of land on the north side of the Ohio River. The claim of Kentucky was based upon the fact that the land had been originally an island in the river, and within her jurisdiction, as described in the act of cession, and that the channel of the river had been so changed by natural causes as to run south of the island and leave it attached to the Indiana shore. It was held that this did not affect the ownership, and that the territory, formerly an island, belonged to Kentucky, though on the Indiana side of the channel. As the northwest territory ceded by Virginia to the United States was described as lying northwest of the Ohio, it was held that this description excluded the bed of the river, and that the boundary of Kentucky extended to the northern bank of the river at low water mark.

The counter-cases of Missouri and Nebraska [7] (1904) involved the ownership of a parcel of land which had, by the operation of a freshet, been transferred in a single night in July, 1867, to the Missouri side of the river, by the shifting of its course and the cutting of a new channel through the State of Nebraska. A distinction was drawn in this case between an accretion or gradual wearing away of the bank of a river and avulsion or tearing away of the land by the sudden opening of a new channel. In the latter case the boundary is not changed, but remains as before, and hence the land was adjudged to Nebraska, though on the Missouri side of the river. A similar case between Iowa and Nebraska [1] arose in 1891, and was decided upon the same principles.

The case of *Louisiana* vs. *Mississippi* [2] (1905) concerned a cluster of islands in what is known as the Mississippi Sound, in the northern part of the Gulf of Mexico, chiefly valuable for its oyster beds. It may be remarked that the appetizing oyster has been a fertile source of litigation and sometimes of warlike demonstrations between the Southern States for at least a century. The case also involved the meaning of the term "thalweg," or mid-channel, as used in international law. The islands in dispute were awarded to Louisiana, and jurisdiction over them was relinquished by Mississippi without opposition.

In *Iowa* vs. *Illinois* [3] (1892) the controversy arose between the two States as to the taxability of nine bridges across the Mississippi between them. Illinois claimed the right to tax them to the middle of the steamboat channel, Iowa claiming to the middle of the body of the river between the banks, regardless of the channel of commerce. The court declared the boundary line to be the middle of the main navigable channel and not the middle of the bed of the river between the banks.

On the contrary, in a suit between Washington and Oregon [4] (1908) it was held that the middle of the main channel of the Columbia River was not necessarily the exact line between the two States, and that, where the boundary is established in the centre of a particular channel, it so remains, subject to changes by accretion, notwithstanding another channel may become more important and be regarded as the main channel of the river.

A similar case was that of *Missouri* vs. *Kansas* [5] (1908) where the boundary line between them was held to be the middle of the Missouri River, notwithstanding its shifting position in consequence of erosion, and that an island in the Missouri River west of its main channel, as that channel now exists, belongs to Kansas, notwithstanding such island is east of the original boundary line.

In a case between Maryland and West Virginia [6] (1910) long-continued possession and acquiescence in a boundary line run in 1788 was held to govern, notwithstanding it may not be astronomically correct.

These are practically all of the boundary cases between the States. Considering that the number of States has varied from thirteen to forty-six; that most of the boundaries were not marked by artificial monuments; that of those that were erected many have been forgotten, neglected or have decayed, and in one or two cases a resurvey had to be made; that where the dividing line was a river, its course was often diverted by the shifting of sands, thus changing the channel, or transferring land

[1] 7 How. 660. [2] 17 How. 478. [3] 11 Wall. 39. [4] 11 Wall. 395. [5] 23 How. 505. [6] 136 U. S. 479. [7] 196 U. S. 23.

[1] 143 U. S. 359. [2] 202 U. S. 1. [3] 147 U. S. 1. [4] 211 U. S. 127; 214 U. S. 205. [5] 213 U. S. 78. [6] 217 U. S. 1, 577.

from one side of the river to the other, or through the operation of a freshet the waters would open a new channel for themselves by cutting the neck of the oxbow, leaving large tracts of land upon the other side of the channel,—we ought rather to be surprised that only some twenty cases have arisen and gone to judgment.

But while the boundary cases constitute the most numerous class, they are by no means the only source of litigation between the States. The ordinary causes of contention between individuals occasionally arise between States and are productive of litigation. The Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution declared that the judicial power of the United States should not extend to suits by private citizens against a State. Being thus barred from suing in their own names, certain enterprising citizens of New York and New Hampshire in 1882, holding bonds of the State of Louisiana, which they were unable to collect, conceived the idea of assigning their bonds to their own State and bringing actions in the name of these States against Louisiana, and thus avoid the effect of the Amendment. They seem to have had no difficulty in obtaining the consent of their own legislatures to this arrangement, as legislatures like individuals are always anxious that other people should pay their debts. But they had yet to obtain the sanction of the Supreme Court, which was not forthcoming. That Court held [1] that one State cannot create a controversy with another within the meaning of the Constitution by assuming the prosecution of debts owing by such other State to its own citizens.

Certain bond holders of the State of North Carolina, warned by the failure of this attempt to circumvent the Constitution, resorted to a more successful device. The owners of these bonds, having their offices in Wall Street, and being, as they themselves declared, "persons who liberally give charity to the needy, the deserving and the unfortunate," donated ten of these bonds to the State of South Dakota for the benefit of some of its asylums and other charities. The State accepted them, and brought suit against the State of North Carolina in 1903. As the bonds were given outright and absolutely to the State, the Supreme Court found that the motives which actuated the donors were immaterial, and held that the plaintiff was entitled to judgment, four justices dissenting. In view of the fact that the original owners of these bonds were the owners of the entire issue of $250,000, there may be a suspicion that they hoped in some way to secure the payment of the whole issue, as well as a handsome commission from the State of South Dakota for collecting the amount recovered upon the judgment. But, in giving reasons for judgments, suspicions are very unsafe arguments. Besides, we have high authority for saying that charity covereth a multitude of sins.

In 1906 the Supreme Court sustained jurisdiction in a suit by Virginia against West Virginia for an accounting for a proper proportion of the public debt of the old Commonwealth, but the suit has not yet gone to judgment.

Another class of cases has recently appeared, turning upon the right to control the waters flowing through different States. The earliest case arose in connection with the celebrated drainage canal from Lake Michigan to the Mississippi, which was built for the purpose of carrying off and eventually discharging into the Mississippi the sewage of Chicago, instead of ejecting it into Lake Michigan, as had previously been done. The Court overruled a demurrer and sustained a bill brought by the State of Missouri against Illinois and the Sanitary District of Chicago[1] upon the ground that the construction of the canal would prove dangerous to the health of Missouri and its inhabitants. Upon a subsequent hearing on the merits, it was held that the plaintiff had not made out its case of a nuisance dangerous to health, and the suit was dismissed without prejudice to another if other facts were developed.

Shortly thereafter another case arose of even greater importance. This was a suit brought by the State of Kansas against the State of Colorado[2] to enjoin her from absorbing for the use of her own inhabitants the waters of the Arkansas River, which rises in the Rocky Mountains in Colorado and flows through the State into Kansas, and there becomes a navigable stream usable for the purposes of trade and commerce. The allegations of the bill relied upon the fact that Colorado was making use of more than her share of the water for the purposes of irrigation, and would ultimately absorb the whole of it and ruin the river for navigable purposes within the State of Kansas. The jurisdiction was sustained, but upon a hearing upon the merits, the Court acted as it did in the Chicago drainage case, holding that Colorado had not diverted so much of the water as to make an inequitable apportionment between the two States, the advantages accruing to Colorado by irrigation being a fair offset to any injury done to Kansas by diminishing the use of her portion of the river for the purposes of navigation. The suit was dismissed without prejudice to a new one, in case it was made to appear that Colorado was appropriating a quantity of water to the material injury of the river in Kansas, and also without prejudice to the right of the Federal Government to take action deemed to be necessary to preserve the navigability of the river.

The only interesting case I have met with in which jurisdiction was declined is that of *Louisiana* vs. *Texas* [3] in 1899. Texas had established certain quarantine regulations against contagious diseases, which, as charged by Louisiana, had been enforced in a way and with a purpose to build up the commerce of Texan cities which were rivals to New Orleans. An injunction was prayed to restrain Texan officers from enforcing against the interstate commerce from Louisiana, or any part thereof, an embargo or rules or regulations discriminating against Louisiana, or any part thereof, or differing from or more burdensome upon commerce from Louisiana than other States. The suit was dismissed upon the ground that there was no controversy between the two States as such, but one to vindicate the grievances of certain private individuals in New Orleans, which seem to have been the only citizens of the State particularly interested in the controversy.

The pertinence of these cases to the question of the judicial settlement of international disputes depends less upon the fact that, by applying for admission to the Union, the States agreed to the creation of an international court to settle all controversies between them, than to the

[1] 108 U. S. 76.

[1] 180 U. S. 208; 200 U. S. 496. [2] 206 U. S. 406. [3] 171 U. S. 1.

universal acquiescence in the decrees of that court, and in their enforcement without compulsory process. There have been cases where the States have protested against the interference of the Supreme Court and threatened to use force, as where Georgia denounced the penalty of death against any one who should attempt to enforce the process of the Supreme Court in the Chisholm case, in which the Court held that a State could be sued by a private person for a debt; and Pennsylvania resisted with its State militia the decree in the case of the Sloop *Active*. But both of these were cases between individuals, though involving the respective authorities of the State and the Federal Governments. In both cases the States finally yielded, and no actual resort to arms was necessary to vindicate the authority of the Supreme Court.

Even in the celebrated Dred Scott case the decree of the Court was acquiesced in, although the majority of the justices gave utterances to an opinion which ultimately resulted in the Civil War. That a court having jurisdiction of controversies between States is an absolute necessity in a Confederation such as ours, since war is practically the only alternative. It is true the Constitution, Article 1, Section 8, provides that no State shall engage in war, but this is coupled with the provision that the Supreme Court should have jurisdiction of controversies between the States, without which the former would be a mere *brutum fulmen*.

That a war between the States is always a possibility to be reckoned with is evident, not only from the war actually carried on between Pennsylvania and the Connecticut colonists in the Wyoming Valley, to which allusion has already been made, but from a quarrel between Michigan and Ohio in 1835, popularly known as the "Toledo War." The governor of Ohio asserted jurisdiction over the coveted strip, and urged legislation to enforce it. The Legislative Council of Michigan, to meet this, passed an act to prevent the exercise of foreign jurisdiction within the territory of Michigan, which had not yet been admitted as a State. Both legislative bodies adopted defiant resolutions, and provided for the enlistment and equipment of troops. Commissioners were appointed to conciliate the warring factions, but apparently to no purpose. Michigan marched troops into Toledo to organize a court there, and again marched them out and disbanded them. Congress took but little interest in the matter. The Supreme Court was thought to be without jurisdiction, because Michigan had not been admitted as a State, and the Constitution was interpreted to provide only for suits between States. How the affair was settled does not clearly appear, but the disputed territory was ultimately awarded to Ohio, and she has continued to be in peaceable possession. The only lives lost were those of two horses,—one a Michigan and the other an Ohio steed. As a political war cry, it was a great success; as an actual war, it was a total failure.

How far independent nations, connected with no tie of a common Constitution such as ours, could be induced to yield to an international tribunal so much of their sovereignties as would be necessary for the maintenance of a permanent peace is a far different proposition from the one presented in this country. Even under the conditions of our Constitution we found the Supreme Court utterly inadequate to deal with a case where a large number of States on one side were arrayed against a large number on the other side of a political issue. In other words, while the country was convulsed over a question which was thought by both sides to go to the very essence of a free government, it was monstrous to suppose that a universal agitation could be quieted down by the opinion of a majority of nine men, although its judgment in a particular case might be acquiesced in. A tribunal competent to deal successfully with a legal question between two States might be wholly inoperative when applied to a controversy between a dozen States upon each side. The provisions of the Constitution, admirable as they are, do not contemplate a political controversy between half of the States upon one side and half upon the other. Herein lies a certain inapplicability of precedence in our Supreme Court to relations between States wholly foreign to each other.

In order that international controversies be judicially settled, there must be an agreement of all the civilized powers in the creation of a tribunal, in the selection of its members and in the enforcement of its decrees. There are difficulties connected with all of these. States which might be perfectly willing to abide by the decree of an impartial tribunal respecting boundaries, riparian or water rights, or pecuniary liability, might in our imperfect state of civilization revolt at the idea of submitting to a decree curtailing their ambitions or impairing their independence. Hence we find, in the arbitral treaties concluded since the Hague Conferences, clauses excluding from their operation cases involving the independence, vital interests or honor of the parties, but providing no method of determining whether a particular case does involve any of these questions.

Again, with regard to the personnel of the court. This is a matter of exceeding difficulty. Either the court must be so large as to contain representatives of every civilized nation, and thus become too cumbersome for practical use, or the judges must be selected with reference to the particular case — the present plan. No workable court could be impanelled which could deal successfully with all cases liable to be brought before it. It is easy to conceive of two of the Latin nations agreeing upon arbitrators or judges who might be wholly unacceptable to the nations of northern Europe. It would hardly be expected that Oriental states would be willing to submit their differences to Occidental judges, or that England and Germany would ever consent to be bound by the judgment of a court composed of Chinese and Japanese judges, or even of those of Italy and Spain. There are also religious differences, as between Mohammedan and Christian, Protestant and Catholic, Roman and Greek, which might complicate the situation and render a permanent court impracticable. Hence it seems that the present system of appointing one member of the court from each of the contending nations, with three, five or seven neutrals, contains the greatest promise of success. No one who was present at The Hague during the argument of the Fisheries case could fail to be impressed by the dignity of the court, the apparent desire of all the members to do exact justice between the parties, even though it involved opinions by the two representative judges of England and the United States adverse to their own countrymen. It was easy to see without a personal acquaintance with the neutral members of the court that they were men of great learning and strength of

character — an impression which was not belied by their answers to the questions submitted to them. Looking at the work done by this court, and the satisfaction expressed by both sides at its judgment, a disinterested observer is impressed with the idea that a successful disposition of a long standing dispute has precluded almost the possibility of a war with Great Britain.

Obviously some method must be found of enforcing obedience to the decree of an international court. This can only be done directly in two ways. First, by the victorious party using its own army and navy and virtually carrying on a war, which it was the very object of the arbitration to avoid; or, second, by the establishment of an international force large enough to compel the submission of the defeated party. There are so many obstacles to the exercise of such a power in cases where but one or two nations are interested, so many natural jealousies to be surmounted in carrying out the decree, that it can hardly be regarded as a practicable method of enforcement.

The creation of a world-wide public opinion strong enough to curb the warlike propensities of particular nations seems to me our only reliance in the present state of civilization. Such progress as has already been made in this direction has been the result of an increasing conviction of the uselessness of wars and an increasing belief that in the blessings of peace is to be found the true grandeur of nations. A stable public opinion is usually a matter of slow growth; but, in view of what has already been accomplished, we may be hopeful, though not sanguine, that very much more may be done and a peace sentiment established which will ultimately sweep the whole world into its embrace. Wars for trivial causes have already practically ceased between civilized nations. May we not contemplate the awakening of a public sentiment that even emperors, kings and ministries may not defy? The first step in this direction must be the limitation of armaments by treaty. So long as the great powers of Europe persist in multiplying their Dreadnaughts and in training every man as a soldier liable to be called upon for immediate service, employment must be found for them to justify their existence. The world will not continue to burden itself with the enormous expense of modern armaments without an occasional showing of its necessity. While there may be some truth in the adage that a readiness for war is an assurance of peace, there is another side to the proposition, — an instant preparedness for war by one nation invites a coalition of powers to resist it, which will ultimately bring on a general war. This was the case in Napoleon's time, when the readiness of France for war brought on a combination of European states resulting in the ultimate destruction of the dynasty.

To such efforts as this and kindred societies may be able to make, — to a gradually increasing pressure of public opinion upon the leading statesmen of Europe,— the world may yet, in the progress of time, be brought to adjust its difficulties upon the basis of an enlightened judicial settlement.

The first workingmen's Peace Society in Italy has just been organized at Milan with eighteen thousand members. The names of the signers were secured by Alma Dolens, whose speeches at the Stockholm Peace Congress last autumn delighted everybody.

The Moral Issue Involved in War.

BY ANDREW CARNEGIE.

Address delivered at the Conference of the American Society for Judical Settlement of International Disputes, New Willard Hotel, Washington, D. C., Thursday, December 15, 1910.

Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen: I have listened with deep interest to the speeches which have been delivered here to-night, and have realized more than ever the importance of the work of this society. We must get a code of international law. [Applause.]

I have placed within reach of the chairman a fund that may be contributory to the success of this great work. [Applause.] But I am not to speak to you upon law to-night. Circumstances prevented me from following the law, and so I attached myself assiduously to the profits. [Laughter.] You have only to spell that in the simplified spelling which I have adopted, and which others must soon adopt, in order to understand my position. [Laughter.]

Ladies and gentlemen, I am persuaded that, costly as war is,— and the way that cost is increasing is ominous, — enormous as may be the expense of building ships for war, and the still greater expense of maintaining those ships when there is no war,— and seventy per cent. of all your taxation in this country is spent on war or pensions connected with war,— I am persuaded that it will not be from that great expenditure that we shall reach the state which we are rapidly approaching and are bound to reach, the abolition of war. [Applause.] We must appeal to the masses upon the moral issue involved in war. [Applause.]

The demagogue knows full well that he has only to arouse the passions of the people against another nation, to obtain votes for enormous expenditures for the so-called honor of his country. "Our country, right or wrong" is still a potent cry, its "honor" a sacred cause, and well do the demagogues understand this. This is the kind of patriotism which Johnson said was the refuge of scoundrels, and so it is to-day the refuge of scurvy politicians. [Applause.]

We must look above the mere money cost of war in order to effect its abandonment. As long as the yearly increase of the national wealth of the chief nations of the world is so incredibly great, we are above the question of the money cost. Great Britain is supposed to increase in national wealth every year $4,000,000,000. You know what our own census tells us about America. It is not war itself that is the most expensive, because war seldom happens; it is the danger of war, which hangs like a dark cloud over the whole atmosphere of the world, that we must dread. No, gentlemen, means will always be forthcoming for war.

The great crime in war is that man kills man, made in the image of God, and we must bring the masses up to that point that they may understand that war is not simply a wrong, that it is not a stimulating element for the vigor of the race, but that it is the great crime of civilization, the killing of men by men like wild beasts. [Applause.]

Fortunately no custom has received such unstinted denunciation as war. From ancient times, long before Christ, it has been held up to us as "the foulest fiend ever vomited forth from hell," and age after age words of similar import have come from the masters and leaders